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South Africa
In the third democratie election since the end of apartheid, the African National Congress
(ANC) Consolidated its hold on power with an even larger majority. South Africa confirmed
its role as the leading economie, political and military power in sub-Saharan Africa and as
Africa's interlocutor with major foreign powers. While President Thabo Mbeki set out on
his second term in office, debate on his succession opened up. Vice-President Jacob Zuma,
the most likely candidate for the presidency, became entangled in a drawn-out court case
in which one of his business associates faced charges of fraud and corruption.
Criticism of government performance focused on its ineifective HIV/AIDS policies, its
policy of 'constructive engagement' with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and the
widening gap between rieh and poor in South Africa itself. Economie growth, at 3.7%,
exceeded expectations but with little effect on high unemployment figures. In his state
of the nation address, Mbeki announced a swing in socioeconomic policies from neo-
liberalism towards the concept of the developmental state.
Domestic Politics
Unemployment emerged as the biggest single issue in the election campaign for
the national and provincial elections on 14 April. The main Opposition parties, the
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Democratie Alliance (DA) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) had concluded an electoral
alliance on a platform of free market policies, extending to deregulation of the labour mar-
ket. The alliance blamed the continuing high unemployment on over-regulation and over-
protection of workers in the formal economy, whose hard-won rights are being jealously
protected by the trade unions. The liberal alternative is a two-tier labour market, with the
'third world' at the bottom efiectively unregulated. The DA has also suggested export-pro-
cessing zones, where South Africa's labour laws would not apply. The DAdid not succeed
in its attempts to shed its image of being a party of white liberals protecting white privilege,
in spite of ongoing efforts to attract prominent black faces into the party. For its part, IFP
did not manage to extend its electoral base beyond its core constituency of Zulus and a sec-
tion of white voters in KwaZulu-Natal. The alliance with the IFP enabled the DA, however,
to present a more balanced racial profile on platforms and in local government. The polit-
ical alternative advocated by this Opposition alliance is unacceptable to the Congress of
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the main trade union movement that makes up part
of the tripartite alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP).
In the electoral campaign, the ANC benefited from the celebration of 'Ten Years of
Freedom' by underscoring the hard-won liberties and rights in the ten years of democratie
rule, which it equated with ten years of ANC government. Among the achievements are vast
improvements in access to water and electricity, the building of l .4 m new houses, an
increase in adult literacy from 83% to 89%, an increase in welfare benefits and the begin-
nings of a more equitable distribution of land. The election campaign passed uneventfully,
with none of the campaign-related violence that marked earlier elections. Despite fears of
a revival of tensions in KwaZulu-Natal, there were few incidents.
Turnout was 76.7% of registered voters, compared with 89.3% in 1999. Of 27.4 m
eligible voters, about 75% had registered. The ANC achieved its largest majority yet. For
the first time, the ANC also became the majority party in all nine provinces, including the
hotly contested Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. With 69.6% of the national vote, the
ANC polled well above a two-third majority. The official Opposition DA came second
again, with 12.3%, while the IFP polled only 6.9%, compared to 8.6% in 1999. The
New National Party (NNP) was virtually annihilated, with 1.8% (seven seats in
parliament).
Of a total of 400 seats, 279 went to the ANC, 50 to the DA and 28 to the IFP. Next was
the United Democratie Movement (UDM) with nine seats. Patricia de Lille's Independent
Democrats, like the NNP, won seven seats; the African Christian Democratie Party six seats;
the Freedom Front Plus four seats; and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the United
Christian Democratie Party three seats each. AZAPO (Azanian People's Organisation)1
obtained two seats, as did the (largely Indian) Minority Front. As in previous elections, most
South Africans voted along racial lines, although the ANC made substantial inroads into the
Indian working class neighbourhoods of Durban and the Coloured working class areasof
the Western Cape. %
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Mbeki retained a strong women's presence in the cabinet. Jacob Zuma was returned äs
vice-president, in spite of bis involvement in a complex case of alleged fraud and corrup-
tion (see below). Zuma bas been hailed for bis conciliatory role in defusing the potentially
explosive conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, where IFP-ANC rivalry has claimed hundreds of lives
since the mid-1980s. With Mangosuthu Buthelezi sidelined, the Zulu presence in the cab-
inet was significantly diminished. The reappointment of Zuma, one of the most prominent
Zulus in the ANC leadership, may be prompted by the imperative to maintain some kind
of ethnic balance in the cabinet. Pallo Jordan, known äs an outspoken voice with an inde-
pendent mind, returned to the limelight with bis appointment äs minister of culture. Ronnie
Kasrils switched frorn water affairs back to being minister of intelligence services. Alec
Erwin moved from the department of trade to public enterprises. Trevor Manuel stayed on
äs minister of finance. A surprise was the appointment of AZAPO's Mosibudi Mangena äs
minister of the newly created portfolio of science and technology. The IFP no longer figured
in Thabo Mbeki's new cabinet. IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who served äs minister
of home affairs previously, was not appointed to any cabinet position. Two IFP candidates
for junior cabinet posts withdrew. After the elections, IFP said it would continue its coop-
eration with the DA.
The NNP, having been deserted by its historical constituency (the white Afrikaans-
speaking minority), failed to attract black votes. It decided to dissolve itself as a party after
its 90th anniversary in August and invited its followers to join the ANC. NNP leader
Marthinus van Schalkwyk himself joined the ANC and was rewarded with the portfolio of
environmental affairs and tourism. Former President F.W. de Klerk, however, resigned from
the party in protest against the recommendation to join the ANC. Even in the Western Cape,
where the NNP succeeded in building a coloured constituency, the party obtained only five
seats in the provincial legislature. Afrikaners had either withdrawn from politics or joined
forces with the DA or the conservative Freedom Front (Plus). In the 2004 elections,
Afrikaners became the largest group of non-voters. It was agreed that local NNP councillors
who crossed the floor to the ANC would retain their seats. As a consequence of the floor-
crossing option, the ANC also became the majority party in the Cape Town metropolitan
council. Thus, the architects of apartheid have been swallowed by their historical foes.
In the Western Cape, Ebrahim Rasooi took over the premiership from Van Schalkwyk,
again heading an ANC-NNP coalition, but with a diminished NNP component. In the
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) legislature, the ANC won 38 seats, the IFP 30 and the DA seven.
The IFP lodged 42 complaints of irregularities in the election process, but shortly after the
independent electoral commission declared the election to be free and fair, the IFP with-
drew its legal challenges. Party leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi said that he did not want to
l \ spoil the celebrations for the first decade of democracy. In the new ANC-led provincial gov-
ernment, the IFP retained three ministers, but party President Buthelezi said at Inkatha's
July conference in Ulundi that the IFP nonetheless considered itself as an Opposition party.
£ The new ANC premier S'bu Ndebele declared the city of Pietermaritzburg both the leg-
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islative and administrative capital of the province. Under IFP rule, the provincial govern-
ment had shuttled back and forth between Pietermaritzburg and Ulundi, the former capital
of the KwaZulu Bantustan. In the North West Province, Popo Molefe, one of the leading
figures in the anti-apartheid United Democratie Front in the 1980s, resigned from politics
to pursue a career in business.
The funding of political parties became a contentieus issue, with both the DA and the
ANC refusing to accede to requests to open their books. Some large companies, such as the
mining giant Anglo-American, AngloVaal Mining, AngloGold, and the Communications
giant MTN stated that they contributed to the campaigning costs of all parties represented
in parliament. Some black business consortia emerging from black empowerment deals (see
below) donated substantial amounts to the ANC. At the request of former presidents De
Klerk and Mandela, who made a joint appeal for funds for political parties, the insurance
firm Sanlam gave R l m each to the ANC and the NNP.
A judicial inquiry, the Hefer Conimission, named after its head, cleared the Public
Prosecutor Bulelani Ngcuka of allegations that hè had worked as a secret agent for the
apartheid regime. Retired Judge Joos Hefer stated that the allegations were "ill-conceived
and entirely unsubstantiated." Rumours about Ngcuka having betrayed his comrades in the
anti-apartheid struggle started circulating after his announcement in 2003 that hè had prima
facie evidence that Vice-President Jacob Zuma had been involved in soliciting bribes.
Ngcuka added, however, that prosecution would have no prospect of success. President
Mbeki acted quickly by setting up a judicial inquiry into the allegations against Ngcuka.
During the judicial hearings, the origins of the rumours were traced to former Minister of
Transport Mac Maharaj and Mo Shaik, an advisor to the foreign ministry. Maharaj had also
been questioned about payments from Schabir Shaik (brother of Mo Shaik) into his wife's
bank account. The previous year, in July 2003, Ngcuka had called a confidential press
briefing with black editors, which resulted in a wave of unfavourable publicity about the
vice-president. Zuma laid a complaint with the Public Protector Lawrence Mushwana, who
concluded that the public prosecutor was to be blamed for improper conduct. Ngcuka
resigned in July, after ten years as national directer of public prosecutions. Ngcuka also
headed the elite investigative unit, the Scorpions, modelled on the FBI. On 8 November,
hè was appointed executive chairperson of black empowerment Company Amabubesi
Investments.
Because of this judicial inquiry, public attention was temporarily diverted away from the
original corruption case against Zuma and Schabir Shaik. Vice-President Zuma is alleged %
to have solicited a yearly bribe of R 500,000 from the French arms Company Thomson CSF«|
(now Thales) to shield the Company from being investigated for improper dealings in the <a
controversial multibillion arms deal concluded by the South African government in 2000,
On 11 October, the trial against Zuma's financial advisor Schabir Shaik opened in the high "ï
court in Durban, amid intense media speculation that a conviction of Shaik would also prt J
an end to Zuma's ambitions for the presidency. Shaik faced charges of corruption and fraad» J
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Both Zuma and Shaik have a long history in the anti-apartheid struggle, during which Shaik
acted as a money smuggler for the ANC. He later became a businessman and acted as finan-
cial advisor to his long-time friend Zuma. Shaik owns one of the arms companies under
investigation. According to the charge sheet, Shaik's Company, Nkobi Holdings, has since
1995 paid substantial amounts to Zuma in cash, bonds, loan repayments, school-fees for his
children, etc. in return for Zuma's help in obtaining government contracts. Zuma has not
been charged, but he did send legal representatives to the court case, which continued into
2005. Zuma hinted that the charges are inspired by political motives.
Winnie Madikizela-Mandela's appeal against her conviction on numerous charges of
fraud and theft was partially successful (5 July). The Pretoria high court changed her four-
year sentence to a wholly suspended sentence. The judge dismissed 25 charges of theft
against the former president of the ANC's Women's League, but upheld the conviction on
43 charges of fraud. The charges related to a scam involving bank loans, with letters signed
by Madikezela-Mandela stating falsely that the applicant was employed by the Women's
League. The ANC welcomed the ruling and stated that Madikezela-Mandela still has a valu-
able role to play in South African society.
Dozens of parlianientarians came under scrutiny in a probe launched in 2003 into the
misuse of travel vouchers. The names of MPs accused of cashing expenses for trips that
were never made have not been disclosed. In September, when the Nigerian-owned but
Johannesburg-based newspaper 'ThisDay' listed 92 present and former ANC MPs as
being involved in the travel scam, the ANC demanded retraction of the article and a writ-
ten apology to all those named in the article.
Rifts in the Tripartite Alliance were temporarily plastered over during elections times,
but flared into the open again in the second half of the year. The SACP was unhappy with the
pact with the NNP. A massive strike by public servants, organised by unions in the education,
health and security sectors in September, was resolved through a deal with five of the eight
public sector unions. They accepted a three-year agreement with slightly higher wages than
previously offered by the government. A remarkable feature of the strike was that for the first
time large numbers of whites turned out to demonstrate alongside their black colleagues. In
November, a meeting of the Alliance was postponed indefmitely because of differences over
Mbeki 's policy on Zimbabwe and over Black Economie Empowerment (BEE) policies (see
below). COSATU voiced unprecedentedly harsh criticism of Mbeki's stance on Zimbabwe,
which was seen as supportive of President Mugabe. On 26 October, a 14-member COSATU
delegation was deported from Zimbabwe shortly after arrival in Harare, and was severely cen-
sured by Mbeki, who accused the COSATU leaders of showing contempt for a sovereign gov-
ernment. Mbeki questioned the motives of the COSATU leaders, whom hè accused of
adventurism and grandstanding while the South African government was seeking to bring
about a negotiated sertlement in Zimbabwe.
Archbishop emeritus Desmond Tutu added his voice to the mounting critique when hè
questioned BEE policies in an address on 23 November at the Nelson Mandela Foundation
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in Houghton. He said that BEE seemed to benefit only a small "recycled" elite and did lit-
tle for poverty alleviation. He begged bis audience to keep the "struggle values" in mind
and to strive for a caring, compassionate society. Tutu also raised the issue of Basic
Income Grants (BIG) of R 100 to R 200 a month for all South Africans. The government
discarded the scheme äs unaffordable and undesirable. It also argued that a 'hand-out' would
not encourage people to look after themselves. The Nobel laureate branded this response
as "extremely cynical" in a society where some people become rieh overnight by the stroke
of a pen. Tutu praised the many achievements of ten years of democracy, but also voiced
concern over freedom of expression and the lack of open debate within the ANC, pointing
out the dangers of "uncritical, sycophantic, obsequious conformity." President Mbeki hit
back on his ANC website, accusing the archbishop of inadequate knowledge of the facts and
a lack of "respect for the truth."
Shortly before the elections, the government announced a national HIV/AIDS treatment
Programme, involving the provision of antiretroviral drugs in all provinces. Treatment
became more widely available, with 103 clinics now accredited by government to provide
antiretroviral therapy and counselling facilities. Minister of Health Mantombazana
Tshabalala-Msimang was reinstated after the April elections, in spite of her unpopularity
with AIDS activists. Shortly after her reinstatement, the directer of the government's pro-
gramme on AIDS resigned. More than 20% of people between the age of 15 and 49 are
believed to be HIV positive. By 2010, life expectancy will be 43 years, 17 years less than
South Africa would have had without AIDS. The South African government remained
reluctant to provide statistics. However, the start of the treatment programme did not silence
the acrimonious public debate on the AIDS issue, which increasingly unfolds along racial
lines. President Mbeki launched a scathing attack on "white bigots" during a parliamentary
debate on HIV/AIDS in October. When asked about his silence on a pandemic, which has
infected some 5.6 m people in South Africa, causing at least 600 deaths a day, Mbeki replied
that some white people regard blacks as "rampant sexual beasts, unable to control our
urges." The DA said Mbeki's comments were a disgrace, and that hè had made false accu-
sations of racism.
White reactionary minorities remained in the headlines. In Pretoria, the trial began of
22 rightwing whites of the Boeremag (Boer Force) who stand accused of conspiracy to top-
ple the government. Giving evidence, one of the accused stated in May that hè believed at
the time that a coup d'état was the only way of ensuring the survival of white Soötfck
Africans. The plotters had planned to take over military bases and police stations. In another
case, 60-year-old Eugene Terre'Blanche, leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, was
released from jail on 11 June after serving three years of a five-year sentence for attentpteo
murder of a black security guard in 1996.
A scandal involving South African-based mercenaries intent on staging a coup
Equatorial Guinea caused much publicity when it turned out that local resident
Thatcher, the son of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was among the J
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pected British financiers. In Zimbabwe, 70 men allegedly on their way in March to stage
a coup in Equatorial Guinea were arrested on charges of gunrunning and espionage. They
were all travelling on South African passports. Zimbabwean authorities said they were on
their way to join 15 other suspected mercenaries, including eight South Africans, who had
been arrested in Equatorial Guinea. They were accused of plotting the overthrow of
President Teodoro Obiang and to install Opposition leader Severo Moto as head of state.
Initial reports indicated that both South Africa and Zimbabwe wanted the mercenaries
extradited to Equatorial Guinea to stand trial in Malabo. Zimbabwe was apparently offered
a highly favourable deal involving the delivery of oil. The recently discovered rieh oil fields
of Equatorial Guinea also attracted South African interest, but both countries changed their
mind after damning reports by Amnesty International about human rights abuses and extra-
judicial executions in Equatorial Guinea. Between 12 and 16 local plotters had reportedly
been summarily executed. The alleged plotters could face the death penalty in Equatorial
Guinea. Lawyers acting for the families of the mercenaries took their case to the constitu-
tional court, demanding that the South African government act to protect the men against
human rights abuses and to ask for them to be extradited to South Africa to stand trial under
the anti-mercenary acts. Counsel for the states argued that respect for the sovereignty of
other African states made it impossible for South Africa to intervene, even by diplomatic
means. Judge Albie Sachs (himself a previously exiled ANC activist) argued that it is
increasingly accepted that human rights conventions supersede issues of sovereignty.
Alleged coup leader Nick du Toit stated on 23 August in the court in Malabo that hè had
been hired by Briton Simon Mann, who had assured him that the coup attempt was sup-
ported by Spain, where Opposition leader Severo Moto lives in exile. In Harare, Simon
Mann, a former British army officer, pleaded guilty to attempts to purchase arms for a coup
in Equatorial Guinea. According to their lawyers, both men had been tortured into making
confessions. Mann was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, which were later reduced
to four years. The two pilots were sentenced to 16 months, while 62 men were sentenced
to one year. Two were acquitted, two more freed for medical reasons and one died in jail.
After a hearing in Cape Town, Mark Thatcher was released on bail and later fined R 3 m
after pleading guilty to contravening South Africa's anti-mercenary law. The affair was con-
sidered beneficial for the credibility of South Africa's intelligence services, as it turned out
that they had prior knowledge of the plot. They had, however, not prevented the men from
boarding a plane to Harare. Most of the alleged conspirators had served in the apartheid
defence force.
Many former apartheid soldiers have not been successfully integrated into civilian soci-
ety. A substantial number of ex-soldiers and ex-policemen are reported to be active in pri-
vate security firms in Iraq, where very attractive salaries are paid. Some are employed in
the burgeoning private security industry in South Africa itself, which also provides employ-
ment to veterans from the anti-apartheid struggle. However, two-thirds of former libera-
tion fighters are reported to be unemployed. Since the integration process started in 1994,
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17,000 MK veterans (the armed wing of the ANC) and 6,000 APLA members (the Azanian
People's Liberation Army was the armed wing of the PAC) were inducted into the new
South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Once demobilisation began, many found
they lacked the qualifications, such as a high school diploma, to find a civilian job.
South Africa's vibrant print media sector underwent some interesting changes during
the year. 'ThisDay', the newspaper launched only a year earlier by Nigerian media mag-
nate Nduka Obaigbena, closed on l November. It had lost about € l .5 m, with a circulation
of less than 20,000. By contrast, the 'Daily Sun', modelled on the UK tabloid, reported a
growth in circulation to over 400,000 copies, a record in sub-Saharan Africa.
South Africa mourned the death of three stalwarts of the anti-apartheid straggle. Former
Minister of Justice Dullah Omar died on 13 March. The death of the prominent anti-
apartheid clergyman Christiaan Frederick Beyers Naudé (1915-2004) on 7 September was
mourned by a broad spectrum of South Africans. Five days later, trade union leader Ray
Alexander (1913-2004) died at the age of 91. Born in Larvia, she achieved fame through
her pioneering work in organising the rural poor in the Western Cape in the Food and
Canning Workers Union.
A few weeks before nis 86th birthday in July, Nelson Mandela announced his partial
withdrawal from public life. He said hè now needed some time to read and reflect and to
be with his family. However, he would still be available for selective occasions: "The appeal
is: don't call me, I will call you."
Foreign Affairs
South Africa's dominant role on the continent was further strengthened by the election of
Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as chair of the newly created Peace and
Security Council of the AU. The council should have some muscle, as the EU has agreed
to provide it with $ 320 m for the next two years. African defence ministers reached agree-
ment in January on an African peacekeeping force that may grow to up to 10,000 military
and police personnel. At the AU summit, it was agreed that the pan-African parliament
would be located in South Africa. Some African states, however, are beginning to display
growing resentment towards what they perceive as South African domination of Africaa
affairs.
To counterbalance growing South African domination, the AU moved to firmly place,
NEPAD under its wings. Thus far it has had a semi-autonomous status, which p
helped to attract donor funds. NEPAD is one of Mbeki's pet projects, the programmé'ÖW
underpin his vision of an African Renaissance. It has a socioeconomic as well as a polite
cal dimension. The socioeconomic programme, although criticised as basically represent»!
ing a neoliberal agenda, has been widely embraced by AU members. The politie
dimension, focusing on good governance, has met with less enthusiasm. The
appointed to conduct peer reviews of member states has been stacked with personalities l
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resenting the political elite, with a notable absence of social activists. The crisis in
Zimbabwe is widely considered as the litmus test for NEPAD's and South Africa's sincer-
ity in the pursuit of good governance, but Mbeki has generally been supportive of Mugabe.
In June, Mbeki was invited äs one of Africa's spokesmen to the G8 summit in Georgia,
USA. The G8 has previously committed itself to support NEPAD in exchange for African
commitments on good governance and peer reviews.
South Africa took over the chairmanship of the security organ of SADC. One of its
priorities is to build African potential for conflict management and peacekeeping on the
African continent. South Africa favours the formation of a regional SADC brigade, which
by the end of 2005 should be ready to undertake peace missions. South Africa itself has
peacekeeping forces stationed in two longstanding conflicts: a füll battalion and support
staff stationed in the DR Congo and just less than two battalions in Burundi. Mbeki also
committed 200 men to the AU mission in Darfur. Peacekeeping missions in Africa became
more central to South Africa's foreign policy and defence policy. The department of
defence budgeted R (rand) 700 m for peacekeeping operations in Africa. The new defence
policy no longer lists the defence of the national borders as the primary function of the
armed forces, but defines national defence and peacekeeping in Africa as equal priorities.
Defence procurements reflected the shift in strategy. The government stated its intention
to participate in a new type of Airbus, the A400M, which is being developed in a joint pro-
ject with seven European countries. Pretoria ordered fourteen European Airbus military
cargo haulers at a price of R 11 bn to facilitate airlifts for peace missions. Delivery of the
new Airbus would take place between 2010 and 2014. South Africa currently charters pri-
vate planes flown by Russian pilots for haulage flights to other African destinations. The
order was additional to previous military procurements, which caused considerable con-
troversy when the spin-offfor local contractors proved less than advertised.
On 18 June, South Africa signed military agreements with the DR Congo and Rwanda.
The agreements provide for the delivery of military equipment and training from South
Africa, and for joint peacekeeping operations. In response to criticism about arms deals with
a conflict zone, Minister of Defence Lekota stated that the agreements were signed for
defensive purposes only. In the DR Congo, South Africans will also assist with the Integra-
tion of the various armed forces into one national army. In August, a draft power-sharing
deal for Burundi was signed in Pretoria. Vice-President Zuma, the South African envoy
for Burundi, has been putting pressure on Burundi President Domitien Ndayizeye to speed
up the transition process. However, the deal was opposed by the main Tutsi party, 'Union
Pour Ie Progrès National' (UPRONA). South African troops in Burundi now operate
under UN command, as the UN took over from the AU on l June.
In July, South Africa concluded an agreement with the US for the training and equip-
ping of two infantry battalions for peacekeeping missions. Pretoria had thus far been reluc-
tant to accept American involvement in security matters on the African continent.
Washington had been offering military training - first through the Africa Crisis Response
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Initiative and now through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
Programme - for the past eight years. In spite of their historical rivalry, the UK, the US and
France have become more involved in joint planning and coordination of military inter-
ventions in Africa. South Africa also signed two defence pacts with the UK, aimed at boost-
ing South Africa's capacity for peacekeeping missions. _^_
f
Mbeki's ambitious Africa policy contrasts with the limited capacity of the (SANDF),
which is considered over-age and largely unfit for active duty. As a consequence of the
merger of the armed wings of the liberation movements with the former defence force, the
armed forces could afford little fresh recruitment. With an average age of 34 years, the army
is out of tune with most other armies. Moreover, as the incidence of HIV/AIDS in the
SANDF is believed to be alarmingly high, many military personnel are unfit for deployment
on peacekeeping missions. SANDF told parliament that 23% of the army is HIV/AIDS
infected, but unofficial reports have come up with higher estimates.
A substantial increase in the budget for the intelligente services reflected the expansion
of the presence of the South African secret service on the African continent. Plans were also
announced for a more effective system of border control. The choice for South Africa as host
for the 2010 Soccer World Cup served as an obvious impetus for a more strict surveillance,
as did the decision to locate the pan African parliament in South Africa. According to the
Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi, police foiled a terrorist attack linked to al-Qaida
shortly before the April elections, bupoffered few further details.
South Africa's diplomatic efforts in the DR Congo have paved the way for a large-scale
expansion of South African inining interests into Congo's copper and gold concessions.
Black-owned companies are the main beneficiaries, such as the mining corporation
Mvelaphanda, headed by ANC veteran Tokyo Sexwale. During a visit to Kinshasa (13-14
January), Mbeki reached agreement on a series of deals totalling more than $ 10 bn. Among
the deals is an agreement that South Africa will assist in the rehabilitation of the main state
mining Company, Gecamines. Talks are also under way on the rehabilitation and expansion
of the giant power generating plants at the Inga dam on the Congo River, a project with
strategie importance for the provision of electricity and water to large tracts of Southern
Africa. If implemented, these agreements will integrate the DR Congo more firmly i
S ADC and tie the country to South Africa's economy. The importance of the DR Congo to
South Africa was underlined by the heavyweight delegation, with no less than eight cabi-
net ministers and prominent business leaders from a variety of sectors, ranging from lflia~''
ing to banking, telecommunications and security. Kabila's government has welcomed SOUÄ <
African investors, who could partly replace Belgian and American interests linked to't
Mobutu regime. South Africa also agreed to modernise Kinshasa airport and to build a i
motorway from the airport to the city.
With Zimbabwe heading for an election in March 2005, the South African gove
began to exert slightly more pressure towards the end of 2004 on its northern neightx»*
adhere to international Standards for fair elections. When Harare committed itself W-|
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SADC protocol for free and fair elections, Pretoria hailed this as a victory for Mbeki's con-
structive engagement policies. The SADC protocol, signed in August, sets rules for free-
dom of association and expression, and unobstructed participation in election campaigning,
with all registered political parties having access to public media. Pretoria has consistently
ruled out the use of sanctions against Zimbabwe. At the beginning of the year, Pretoria
claimed that its mediation efforts in Zimbabwe were successful, as both Mugabe's ZANU-
PF and the Opposition Movement for Democratie Change (MDC) had agreed to start infor-
mal talks. In contrast, both parties in Zimbabwe denied that talks had been initiated.
Mbeki's visit to the EU on 15-17 November highlighted the emerging role of South
Africa as a strategie partner on the continent, at least for developments in central and south-
ern Africa. Congo and Cöte d'Ivoire figured high on the agenda of Mbeki's talks. His medi-
ation effbrts in Abidjan (9 November), where hè met with President Laurent Gbagbo but
not with his political opponents, brought no visible results. South Africa and Belgium
agreed to train several brigades of the future integrated Congolese army before the elections
in Congo, scheduled for June 2005. The South African police are also involved in training
the Congolese police force.
In May, South Africa granted political asylum to the deposed president of Haiti, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide. At the beginning of the year, Mbeki had given generous support worth
R 25 m for Haiti's celebration of 200 years of independence. Mbeki himself attended the
anniversary celebrations in January in Port-au-Prince. Shortly afterwards, when President
Aristide was beleaguered by his opponents who were closing in on Port-au-Prince, South
Africa sent an air force Boeing with arms in support of Aristide's government. The move
came too late to stem the tide of the rebel movement and the Boeing landed instead in
Jamaica, because Aristide had already left the country. After an initial stay in the Central
African Republic, the deposed Haitian president headed for South Africa. Mbeki's stance
on Haiti has wider political ramifications, as it is the first South African intervention in
the Western hemisphere.
Socioeconomic Developments
On 19 February, Finance Minister Trevor Manuel tabled a mildly expansionary annual
budget, after years of economie restructuring to limit the budget deficit. Manuel allowed
the deficit to rise to 3. l % for 2004-05, as compared to 2.6% in the previous year. The state
debt, as a percentage of GDP, was reduced from 43.3% in 2000 to 36.8% in 2004.
Expenditure in 2004-05 is budgeted at R 369 bn, from R 332 bn in 2003-04. Projected eco-
nomie growth for the fiscal year 2004—05 was 2.9% compared with a growth in GDP of
l .9% in 2003. Manuel announced a R 20 bn public works programme designed to create a
million jobs over five years. Although South Africa has millions of unemployed, the coun-
try suffers from a lack of skilled labour. Skills improvement will be one of the new spear-
g heads of government policy. The education budget was increased by 10%. The relaxation
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of exchange controls is likely to attract more foreign Investors. Most money for social ser-
vices, poverty relief and social development is spent by the provincial and local govern-
ments. Improving the capacity at provincial and local levels is therefore crucial to the
success of the delivery of'a better life for all', the ANC's election slogan. The central state
intends to take a more active hands-on approach in dealings with the provinces. The bud-
get was welcomed by COSATU, because of its explicit commitment to job creation.
A UNDP report that indicated continuing massive poverty and growing inequality
within all racial groups caused much political controversy. The report stated that almost half
of South Africa's population (21.9 m) continue to live below the national poverty line of R
354 a month. However, there has been visible improvement since 1995, when 51.1% of the
people were living below the poverty line. According to UNDP's statistics, mis percentage
had fallen to 48.5% in 2002. In reaction, the government complained that UNDP had given
insufficient artention to the legacy of apartheid. The democratie government, installed in
1994, first needed to focus on building a new constitutional and legislative framework
before it could move towards implementation. Now, in this third term, the institutional
changes were firmly in place, enabling rapid progress towards delivery.
In its economie transformation audit, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation also
argued that the poor have not yet benefited from the improved growth figures, that BEE has
not contributed to job creation, that the education system is failing the majority of black
youths and that poverty and inequality have deepened. Though 1.7 m jobs were created
between 1995 and 2002, the number of job seekers swelled by 5.3 m over the same period.
For the first time since 1994, official data suggested a slight decrease in the unemployment
rate from 28.4% in September 2003 to 27.8% in March. 4.6 m South Africans were unem-
ployed, using the official defmition. According to unofficial figures, as used by COSATU,
unemployment hovers around 40%, or 8.4 m people. This figure includes the unemployed
who are no longer actively engaged in job seeking, but excludes those employed in the
informal sector. In the official definition, every person who has worked at least one hour in
the previous week is counted as employed. The gap between the new, racially mixed mie-
die class and the millions of largely black South Africans who continue to live in poverty
is causing increasing tensions. Trevor Manuel, speaking at the annual convention of blaefe ^
accountants, stated that the top 20% of earners in South Africa earn almost half of all ft®!
income in the country, while the bottom 20% earn just 4% of income. In August, the j
ernment introduced an ambitious job creation scheme, the Expanded Public Wo
Programme (EPWP), destined to create 200,000 temporary jobs annually in infrasti
development. At the same time, EPWP is meant to improve service delivery, notably iafl
mformal settlements around the big cities. Several isolated incidents indicated thatpafe
in underprivileged communities is running thin. The City of Johannesburg prese
ambitious plans to provide proper infrastructure to informal settlements by 2007. Ace
to a 2003 report by the city's department of housing, an estimated 418,000 people a»l
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ing in backyard shacks, 4,500 people are living on the streets and 170,000 families were
being accommodated in dozens of informal settlements across Greater Johannesburg.
Ten years after the formal end of apartheid, black students still face a formidable back-
log, in spite of the substantial increases in resource allocation to previously disadvantaged
schools. In 2003, only 0.5% of matriculation-aged Africans and 3.9% of so-called
Coloureds obtained a higher-grade maths pass good enough to gain entry to most natural
science, engineering or commerce faculties at universities. Given the low-skills profile of
the unemployed, the current skills-intensive growth path for the economy offers no hope
for the country's poor. On the other hand, a Merrill Lynch research report noted a spectac-
ular increase in the purchasing power of the black middle class, resulting in much
increased demand in the consumer market, notably for clothing, furniture, motor vehicles,
media, housing and cell phones. Clothing retailers experienced a growth in volume of 15%
to 20% over the year. Domestic vehicle sales went up by 5% in 2003. The cell phone mar-
ket also reported spectacular growth, with an estimated 15 m active cell phone users by the
end of 2003. The consumer boom has been encouraged by a sharp fall in interest rates since
2002 and by tax cuts. The reserve bank announced a further cut in interest rates in August,
slashing the rate from 8% to 7.5%.
Economie growth picked up in the third quarter. With a growth of 5.6% of the GDP, the
South African economy had its best performance in eight years. The first quarter registered
4% growth. Finance Minister Manuel, who has been closely associated with neoliberal eco-
nomie policies, cited the figures as evidence that government policy is working and that the
discipline of the past years has paid off. Critics in COSATU believed that the upward trend
was caused by the strength of the rand and the high prices on the world market for gold and
platinum, rather than an improvement in productivity. The local currency strengthened
against the dollar and was expected to maintain its new position well into 2005. From 1988
to 2001, the rand declined each year at an average rate of 14%. Since its lowest point in
December 2001, when the currency hit R 13.80, the rand has appreciated by 52%. During
2004, the rate of exchange averaged R 6-7 per dollar, or about R 8 to the euro.
Land reform lagged behind the stated targets. The land restitution programme involves
land expropriated since the 1913 'Land Act'. Before the 1998 cut-off date, a total of 79,694
claims had been lodged. The processing of claims has been simplified, and by early 2004,
43,205 claims had been settled, often with an offer of monetary compensation. The resti-
tution process is therefore unlikely to make a significant dent in the very uneven racial pat-
tern of land distribution. The vast majority of the claims, some 80%, relate to urban claims.
To speed up the restitution process, scheduled to come to an end in 2005, R l .6 bn was
reserved in the 2004-05 budget. Apart from restitution, a programme of land redistribu-
tion on the basis of willing seller-willing buyer principles aims to achieve a less racialised
pattern of landownership. The government promised that 30% of white-owned land will be
redistributed by 2015, a substantial departure from previously stated more ambitious
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goals. Since 1994, about 3.5 m hectares of land has been redistributed. To meet the 30%
goal, the government needs to redistribute l .87 m hectares a year, a fivefold increase on the
current transfer rate of 350,000 hectares a year. Total farmland in South Africa is about 122
m hectares, of which 82% is white-owned. The costs for this redistribution programme are
estimated at R 17 bn, or about R l .5 bn per year.
South Africa sought to dispel apprehension on the part of foreign Investors about the con-
sequences of its BEE programme. Mbeki assured investors that his government has no
intention of seizing assets for BEE purposes. Earlier, government officials had stressed that
foreign companies were not exempt from meeting empowerment targets. Similar assur-
ances were aimed at China, where Pretoria also hopes to attract Investment. Thus far, South
African Investment in China far outstrips Chinese Investment in South Africa. Trade
between China and South Africa has expanded considerably, causing massive shutdowns
in the South African textile and shoe industry. BEE remained a central tenet of Mbeki's
agenda. In order to enlarge Black ownership in the still largely white-owned business sec-
tor, the government has set targets for the transfer of shares to black business. By 2014,
some 25% to 30% of South African companies should be transferred to black entrepreneurs.
BEE has proven unpopulär with the ANC 's trade union allies. Thus far, most empowerment
deals have served a small black elite closely aligned with the ruling ANC. The unions are
pressing for worker participation in the share-out.
Top ANC officials acquired 15.1% of the telecommunications giant Telkom, which is
destined for partial privatisation. The consortium that bought the black empowerment stake
includes the former director-general of the department of communication, Andile Ngcabe,
and Mbeki's spokesman Smuts Ngonyama. COSATU proposed a cooling offperiod for
politicians and public servants to avoid suspicions that they had used their official positions
as stepping-stones towards a career in business. The trade union leadership branded the deal
as the "very worst form of so-called economie empowerment - which benefits only a tiny
elite." Other high-profile ANC cadres who have benefited from black empowerment deals
over the past years include Bulelani Ngcuka, former Minister of Justice Penuell Maduna
and former Minister of Defence Joe Modise. Black empowerment has come under fire not
only for enriching a tiny elite, but also for perpetuating the racial categories of apartheid,
lts advocates claim that unless decisive action is taken to correct the imbalances in wealth
and ownership, South Africa will forever be faced with calls to impose quotas in order to
achieve proportionally acceptable representation. However, influential voices within the; j
ANC have joined the chorus of critics. Most outspoken was Kgalema Motlanthe, the ANCUjl
secretary-general, who complained that too few people benefit when large white firms haad- J
over minority stakes to black partners. Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota questioned ö»£
wisdom of affirmative action policies in recruitment for the army. Minister of Finance /^
Trevor Manuel was even more outspoken in his criticism when addressing black basi*
nessmen and accountants, whom hè accused of accumulating undeserved riches on the
of their skin colour.
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In the banking sector, Standard Bank, ABSA, FirstRand and the Liberty Group have each
oflbred about 10% of their shares in black empowerment deals. Most of the shares went
to business consortia headed by ANC heavyweights Tokyo Sexwale, Saki Macozoma and
Cyril Ramaphosa. The SANLAM insurance giant, once a prime example of Afrikaner cap-
ital accumulation, signed an empowerment deal with Patrice Motsepe, the chairman of min-
ing Company ARMgold. In the wine sector, plans to implement BEE by transferring shares
to a small group of black business leaders encountered fierce Opposition from the farm-
workers' union, FAWU. In response to leftwing criticism that BEE has thus far only served
the interests of a small black elite, government officials have stressed that the programme
is aimed at broad-based empowerment. Empowerment charters are concluded by sector.
On schedule for 2004 were Information technology, construction, transport, wine and agri-
culture. Charters for the oil, gas and mining sectors had already been concluded in previ-
ous years. The highly successful automobile industry has thus far been shielded from
empowerment deals. South Africa's automotive industry ranked 20th in the world in 2003
and the government regards it as setting the pace for diversifying the industrial economy.
South Africa is responsible for 84% of Africa's vehicle output. In the tourism sector, pres-
sure has also been building for a larger black share in the proceeds.
Tourism is the third largest foreign exchange earner and job creator in South Africa, con-
tributing more than R 25 bn to the economy, or 8.2% of the GDP. A study done in 2003 esti-
mated that only 6% of the tourism enterprises listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
were black-owned. The new minister of tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, promised to
set clear targets for BEE in the tourism sector that would enable regulär monitoring of
progress. Both township tourism and ecotourism have the potential to generate more
income for black participants in the burgeoning tourism industry. The projected liberalisa-
tion of the telecom sector is expected to open new opportunities for outsourcing, thanks
to a stable economy, relatively low costs and the advantage of sharing the same time zone
with Western Europe. Ebrahim Rasooi, premier of the Western Cape province, claimed
South Africa would be a 'credible alternative' to India. He said that British financial ser-
vices were already achieving 40% cost savings. Anew trade body, 'Calling the Cape', airns
to encourage companies in Britain and elsewhere to transfer jobs to South Africa. Randgold
Resources announced an expansion of its mining operations in Mali, with new pro-
grammes scheduled for Senegal, Tanzania and Burkina Faso and a new joint venture in
Ghana. AngloGold took over Ashanti Goldfields for $ l .55 bn. The merged Company, to be
known as AngloGold Ashanti, would become the world's largest gold producer, with 26
mines on four continents producing 7.5 m ounces of gold per year. Post-apartheid South
Africa has become the biggest source of direct Investment on the African continent.
In a series of speeches, Mbeki hinted that South Africa was moving away from neoliberal
orthodoxy towards the concept of the 'developmental state'. He cited various examples,
from state-led growth in the East Asian economies to the example of the EU's regional
fonds, which provide subsidies to stimulate backward regions in member states. The
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government promised a slowmg down of the pace of privatisations: in the next five years
there would be no major privatisation. The government announced in August that the
defence group Denel, the transport Utility Transnet and power group Eskom would remain
state-owned äs they were regarded as strategie assets. The policy shift was hailed by the
ANC's allies on the left, the SACP and COSATU, as a shift from American-style capital-
ism to the social democratie models prevailing in the EU. Policy measures included a sub-
stantial increase in housing subsidies and increases in welfare benefits. The 'activist state'
will provide more jobs through an ambitious public works programme, adult education and
the promotion of small business through a new micro-lending scheme. After more than five
years of preparation, the National Empowerment Fund started in June, with an initial cap-
ital of R 2 bn. The fund aims to provide cheap capital to small and medium-sized business.
Another shift in policy is the new emphasis on an improved skills base as a precondition
for economie growth and new jobs. Part of the scheme is a campaign to encourage the
homecoming of mainly white South Africans who have emigrated over the past years. The
economie impact of the massive numbers of AIDS-related deaths remains unsure, but
the deaths of tens of thousands of skilled people in sectors such as education, health and
other public sector services is likely to cause havoc in years to come.
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